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The contribution of this paper is theoretical foundations for 
dialogical argument mining, as well as initial implementation in 
software for dialogue processing. Automatically identifying the 
structure of reasoning from natural language is extremely 
demanding. Our hypothesis is that the structure of dialogue can 
yield additional clues as to argument structures that are created 
and cocreated. Our work has been performed using the 
MM2012 corpus in OVA+. 
 
KEYWORDS: argument mining, Inference Anchoring Theory, 
dialogue structure. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Argumentative exchanges expressed through dialogical interaction can 
involve many more variables and subtleties than do arguments expressed 
as monologues. In trying to build algorithms that might automatically 
detect the presence and structure of argument, it might be expected that 
research should begin with the simpler monological cases before moving 
on to generalise techniques for dialogue. It turns out, however, that the 
very complexity that makes dialogue so challenging also offers rich 
sources of additional information that can be used to guide the automatic 
recognition process. This paper demonstrates how working with 
broadcast debate using a relatively new approach to the analysis of 
dialogical argumentation can offer insight into the dialogue games that 
participants are playing, and that those dialogue games give detailed grist 
to the algorithmic mill. 
 
2. INFERENCE ANCHORING THEORY  
 
Inference Anchoring Theory – IAT (Budzynska and Reed, 2011) provides 
the framework for connecting dialogical structures with argumentative 
structures thus allowing for the analysis of natural dialogical interactions. 
IAT is not a general-purpose discourse analysis technique. It is tailored 
specifically to handle discourse that involves argumentation, i.e., the 
giving of reasons in support of claims in order to affect an audience. 
Examples of such discourses are mediation (Janier et al., this issue) and 
debate (Janier and Yaskorska, this issue). Let us present the example of a 
simple dialogue: 
 
(1) 
a. Bob: p is the case 
b. Wilma: Why p? 
c. Bob: q 
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Figure 1.  An IAT analysis of the dialogical and argumentative instances. 
 
Figure 1 presents the diagram with IAT analysis of the dialogue 
from example (1). Right-hand side of the diagram consists of the 
propositional reports on locutions (such as “Bob said, p” etc.). Left-hand 
side of the diagram consists of nodes with propositional content (in this 
case: p and q). Three different types of relation are expressed in figure 1:  
i) relations between locutions in dialogues (transition instance 
#1 and #2);  
ii) relations between propositions (rule application instance 
#1); and  
iii) illocutionary connections that link locutions with their 
contents (asserting instance #1 and #2, challenging instance 
#1, arguing instance #1).  
The first type of relations refers to rules of protocol which 
speakers follow to perform locutions during a dialogue game. For 
example, locution (1-b) is a legal response to (1-a) which means that they 
are related via some specific protocol rule of the game. Application of 
those rules creates instances of transitions (transition instance #1 and 
#2). Relations of type (ii) are typically studied in logic and argumentation 
theory. In figure 1, we have only one relation of this type: that is relation 
of inference (rule application instance #1). However, IAT allows for 
expressing also other relations, such as conflict or rephrasing. Relations 
of type (iii) are illocutionary connections with which a given locution is 
performed. In this work, illocutionary connections are intuitively related 
to various illocutionary forces (i.e. the speaker’s communicative 
intentions (Searle, 1969)). 
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Representation of discourse structures involving argumentation 
requires some way of representing relations connecting those two 
elements. In IAT this is achieved by the concept of anchoring illocutionary 
connection. Two general types of anchoring are possible. Example of the 
first type, presented in the figure 1 is the challenging instance #1, as it is 
anchored in the propositional report on locution (on the right-hand side) 
and targets propositional content (on the left-hand side). Illocutionary 
connections anchored in transition and targeting rule application 
instances are the second type. In figure 1 an example of such a connection 
is arguing instance #1. Illocutionary connections anchored in transitions 
are the focus of this paper. 
 
3. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR MINING ARGUMENTS IN A 
DIALOGUE 
 
The research presented in this paper aims to automatically extract 
inferential structures (arguments pro-) and conflict structures (argument 
con-) using as cues their dialogical context (see Budzynska et al 2014a; 
Budzynska et al 2014b). In order to efficiently recognise arguments in a 
dialogue, we need a solid theoretical foundations which will represent 
not only elements of arguments and elements of dialogue, but also explain 
how these two types of structures are connected with each other. 
Inference Anchoring Theory, described in the previous section, is a good 
candidate for such a task, however, the application of IAT to the realm of 
the complex human communicative interactions presents some initial 
challenges and the theory needs to be adapted so that it is robust enough 
to describe how people create arguments during the dialogue.  
We selected the genre of the radio debate and worked with the 
BBC Radio Moral Maze programme (the corpus is available at: 
http://corpora.aifdb.org/, see also Sect. 5). During each 45 minute 
programme, participants discuss moral aspects of important social and 
political issues in Great Britain. The programme is chaired by Michael 
Buerk who leads the discussion between four panellists  ̵̶ public people 
with a background in social activism (writers, journalists, lecturers, 
public commentators etc.). Moreover, so-called witnesses are invited who 
are experts on a given topic and who describe a situation in more detail. 
Such structured radio debate ensures that participants create many well-
formed arguments which can be studied. 
 Consider the example from the programme on problems of 
families where the participants discuss whether or not the State should 
intervene into the problem families in order to decrease the poverty in 
the country. Here Anne and Ruth were trying to establish whether a 
number of families who might need an intervention is sufficient for 
making a moral issue about this. Ruth provides the percentage of badly 
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parented children (according to the Government’s criteria) in the 
troubled families of different boroughs of London. 
(2) a. Anne McElvoy: Isn't it a rather specific example? 
b. Ruth Levitas: No. Birmingham was given a target of 4180, 
they estimate they can find about 7% on the troubled families’ 
criteria. 
 
What we would like to capture here in this example is that Levitas 
introduces the conflict with McElvoy (argument con-) and provides an 
inference (argument pro-) to support her standpoint. Such a 
communication dynamic is relatively simple for a human to recognise, 
but it poses more difficulties for automatic identification of dialogical 
argumentation1. 
First, McElvoy's standpoint is not asserted explicitly qua an 
affirmative sentence but as an interrogative one. Yet questions do not aim 
to provide opinions – they are seeking for them, so the problem is: how 
Levitas can introduce the conflict if there was no opinion provided in (2-
a)? For example, if I say “Do you like apples?”, I am not giving my opinion 
with which the hearer can conflict. I rather want the hearer to provide me 
with her opinion in the matter that I am asking about. Thus, developing 
an algorithm which associate a sequence: a question followed by an 
answer “No”, with a conflict structure is not a good solution, because the 
automatic system would deliver a lot of errors as an output. We need to 
look for a more fine-grained theoretical grounding here. 
A second challenge is related to indexicality which is particularly 
common in dialogical communication, because people typically do not 
repeat a material that was already introduced by their opponents in the 
previous move(s). Imagine I enter the room exactly when Levitas begins 
her turn. Without knowing what happened before (2-b), it is impossible 
to reconstruct the propositional content of her first locution. In other 
words, if I just hear that someone says “No”, it is not possible to 
understand whether she meant “It is not a rather specific example”, “I 
don't like apples” or anything else. From the point of view of the 
automatic recognition, we need a good way of instructing an algorithm 
where to look for the content in such cases and how to extract it2. 
                                                             
1 We assume that dialogical argumentation (or: quasi-dialogical argumentation) 
does not necessarily require two or more speakers. It is sufficient for one speaker 
to introduce quasi-dialogue, when he cites or refers to opinions of his 
opponent(s). In such cases, the speaker can provide con-arguments against his 
opponent(s)' standpoints, and justify his own opinions with pro-arguments. 
2 Note that the indexicality is not a specific property of argumentation -- in fact it 
occurs in any natural communication. Nevertheless, while it is rather rarely 
found in monological argumentation, it becomes an important part of dialogical 
argumentation. 
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The first challenge was addressed by extending the list of the 
illocutionary connections with such ones that are typical for dialogical 
interactions. In the example (2), such a specific connection is assertive 
questioning which has a dual function of both asserting and questioning 
(see Budzynska et al. 2014b for other dialogical connections). More 
specifically, in (2-a) McElvoy does not only seek Levitas’ opinion whether 
it was a rather specific example, but also implicitly conveys her own 
opinion that it was a rather specific example (see figure 2). In contrast to 
a pure question which only seeks for the hearer's standpoint, here the 
speaker (McElvoy) gives her own opinion, and as a result when the hearer 
(Levitas) responds to such an assertive question, the respondent 
(Levitas) provides her opinion as well, and as a result she either agrees 
or disagrees with the previous speaker (in this case – Levitas disagrees 
with McElvoy introducing conflict between their opinions). 
The second challenge, the challenge of indexicality, is addressed 
by anchoring illocutionary connections in transitions. In figure 2, there 
are three such cases: disagreeing, asserting and arguing. If annotators 
analyse the example (2) as it is presented in figure 2 and the data is used 
to develop an algorithm, then the instruction specifies that it is not 
enough to look at the single locution (“RL: No” in figure 2) to extract the 
content of Levitas' assertion, because the asserting connection is not 
anchored in the locution. What is required is to find the transition, check 
which locutions is connected (“AM: Isn't it a rather specific example?” 
with “RL: No”), and then it is possible to recognise what is the 
propositional content of the second locution. In other words, if Levitas 
started her turn in (2-b) by saying “ It is not a rather specific example” 
(the response which is fully repeating the content of the question), then 
the assertion would be anchored in the second locution and there would 
be no need to look at the history of this locution for the automatic 
extraction of its propositional content. 
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Figure 2. Disagreeing and arguing in a dialogical context. 
 
How do these solutions lay foundations for automatically 
extracting inferential and conflict structures from transitions in a 
dialogue? We can instruct an algorithm that if it finds a sequence: pure 
question followed by a word that is equivalent to 'No', then there is no 
conflict introduced, while the conflict structure is created (see CA in 
figure 2), if the algorithm finds a sequence: assertive question followed 
by a word that is equivalent to 'No'. Moreover, since asserting is anchored 
in the transition between locutions and not in a single locution, in order 
to extract the content of “RL: No” the algorithm has to inspect the content 
of the other element of this transition relation. 
To automatically recognise the inferential structure (see RA in 
figure 2), an algorithm has to be instructed that in this type of discourse 
a sequence: a word that is equivalent to “No” followed by assertion, 
anchors inference (in fact in many cases some additional cues are needed 
to increase the efficiency of the instruction). Moreover, the algorithm will 
extract directly the content of the premise, because the assertion 
introducing it is anchored in the single locution (see the bottom of the 
figure 2), however, in order to extract the full inferential structure (both 
premise and conclusion), it has to search for the transition and the second 
element of this relation (i.e. the locution “RL: No”). Still this locution does 
not anchor anything, so that the algorithm should not stop searching 
upwards into the history of the dialogue. Once it reaches the first locution, 
it can go back downwards which will allow for the reconstruction of the 
content of the second locution, which in turn will provide the information 
what is the conclusion of the inference. 
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4. RELATED WORK 
 
Automatic argument mining has received a lot of interest during the past 
years and is now an important application of Computational Linguistics. 
This line of work started in specific domains, in particular that of legal 
language, where Mochales-Palau and Moens (2009) identified claims and 
their justifications in legal texts. Today, the task is sometimes conceived 
more broadly as finding not just pairs of claim and argument, but more 
complex structures involving rebuttals, counterrebuttals, etc.. Genres 
that are being studied include scientific papers (e.g., Kirschner et al. 
2015) and student essays (e.g. Nguyen and Litman 2015). Beyond 
monologue text in “standard” language, lately the research also turned to 
more dialogical communication. Thus, the Internet Argument Corpus 
(Walker et al. 2012) is a collection of contributions to internet discussion 
forums, where users interact with each other to a certain extent. An 
example for analyzing such discourse automatically is the work on online 
user comments by Park et al. (2015). Snaith and Reed (this issue) propose 
the automatic method of inducing context-free grammar from a 
transcript of a dialogue. The extracted grammar describes the formal 
protocol that governs the interaction of this dialogue. Also, Swanson et al. 
(2015) propose an operationalization of the notion of „argument clarity“ 
for such comments, where sentences are being rated (via crowdsourcing) 
in terms of this clarity, and automatically identified on the basis of 
features that to a good extent are domain-neutral. For transcriptions of 
oral dialogue, however, we are not aware of any research other than our 
own. 
Mining the structure of argument in text starts with 
segmentation, i.e., the step of finding the individual spans that correspond 
to the minimal segments of the argumentative structure. Thereafter, the 
two computational tasks to be executed on the basis of a text 
segmentation are (i) to identify the illocutionary connection of individual 
units, and (ii) to identify the relations between those units. For (i), certain 
linguistic features of the utterance (e.g., sentence mode, mood, modality, 
verb class, particles) and the context of recent moves are exploited to 
compute the most likely speech act. The computational dialogue analysis 
community has addressed this task for a long time, using both rule-based 
and statistical approaches; for the latter, see, e.g., (Stolcke et al 2000). 
Task (ii) is closely related to efforts in discourse parsing, which, again, 
usually targets monologue text. One popular framework is Rhetorical 
Structure Theory (Mann and Thompson 1988), which posits that a tree 
structure can be assigned to a text on the basis of recursively linking 
adjacent segments by means of coherence relations. One well-known 
approach to automatically compute these relations and the resulting tree 
structure is that of (Hernault et al. 2010), who divided the task into two 
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separate classifiers for (i) deciding whether to link two segments, and (ii) 
assigning a relation label to such pairs.  
Beyond building a structure description, intellectual argument 
analysis involves judging the plausibility of instances of argumentation. 
This is largely beyond the state of the art of automatic analysis, but an 
important first step into this direction is the automatic classification of 
arguments in terms of Argumentation Schemes (Walton et al. 2008). Feng 
and Hirst (2011) showed that this in principle possible, restricting the set 
of schemes to five frequently-used ones.  
 
5. CORPUS DESCRIPTION 
 
Within the corpus studies, 4 transcripts of the BBC 4 radio program Moral 
Maze were annotated (hereafter MM2012a) according to the IAT 
framework.3 MM2012a contains 58000 words and has 284 questions or 
challenges for about 1417 assertions which are parts of argumentation 
(from total of 2000 identified sentences). Analyses were carried out using 
OVA+4 (Janier et al. 2014) and stored in AIFdb corpus5 (Reed et al. 2008, 
Lawrence and Reed 2014). In the first step, dialogue moves were 
described with illocutionary connections, distribution of which is 
presented in table 1. 
Annotating corpora is a time-consuming task (particularly with 
IAT because of the large variety of schemes and categories); moreover, 
the spoken interactions context makes the task trickier than with 
monologues, hence the relatively small size of our corpus.  
 
                                                             
3 Results provided here account for August, 2015; they may differ from previous 
works given that the corpus was enlarged to add a fourth transcript 
4 http://ova.arg-tech.org 
5 http://corpora.aifdb.org 
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Illocutionary connections Occurrences 
Assertions (A) 1417 
Pure Questions (PQ) 81 
Assertive Questions (AQ) 103 
Rhetorical Questions (RQ) 70 
Total Questions (Q) 254 
Pure Challenges (PCh) 7 
Assertive Challenges (ACh) 10 
Rhetorical Challenges (RCh) 13 
Total Challenges  (Ch) 30 
Popular concessions (PCn) 53 
Other 7 
Total Concessions 60 
Empty (no illocutionary 
connection in locutions) 
88 
Total 1849 
Table 1. The distribution of illocutionary connections anchored 
in locutions in MM2012a corpus. 
 
Within 1849 annotated locutions, apart from the most expected 
illocutionary connections (Assertions: 1417 occurrences), there is also a 
significant number of illocutionary connections via which participants 
introduce premises and conclusions for their arguments (AQ, RQ, ACh, 
RCh, PCon and Con: 256 occurrences). This data illustrates the dynamics 
of radio debates via the variety of illocutionary connections. 
In the next step of the corpus analyses, transitions between 
locutions were identified and illocutionary connections anchored in 
those transitions were described. The distribution of the identified 
illocutionary connections anchored in transitions is presented in table 2. 
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Illocutionary 
connections 
Occurrences 
Arguing 563 
Disagreeing 200 
Agreeing 101 
Restating 78 
Asserting 45 
Questioning 2 
Challenging 3 
Other 80 
Non-anchoring (no illocutionary 
connection in transition) 
360 
Total 1432 
Table 2. The distribution of illocutionary connections anchored in 
transitions in MM2012a corpus. 
 
Within 1432 of all analysed occurrences, 763 (61%) illocutionary 
connections anchored in transitions are related to the process of 
argument construction carried out via the illocutionary connections of 
arguing, disagreeing and agreeing, what illustrates that this type of 
dialogue is very argumentative. The dialogical dynamics proper to 
debates were thus identified: Arguing, Disagreeing and Agreeing. 
Occurrences of other types of argumentative dynamics being far less than 
100 each, we decided to group them all together (Other).  
The MM2012a corpus has been annotated by two annotators that 
have the same linguistic training and a good expertise of the IAT 
theoretical background. Measures of the differences between annotators, 
calculated before discussion, are summarised in table 3. 
 
 
Types of annotation Inter-annotator agreement  
segmentation 79% 
illocutionary connections (YA) 88% 
illocutionary connections (YA) 
anchored in TA 
78% 
conflict relation (CA) 76% 
inference relation (RA) 86% 
transitions (TA) 89% 
Table 3. Inter-annotator agreement measures for MM2012a 
corpus. 
 
We measured the rate of agreement between the two annotators. 
All in all, the agreement rate is relatively high. For this reason, we 
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consider the framework schemes as stable, easy to identify and accurate. 
(see more about argument corpus studies with the use of IAT in: Janier 
and Yaskorska, 2015). 
 
6. AN AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION OF ILLOCUTIONARY 
CONNECTIONS ANCHORED TO TRANSITIONS 
 
Let us now develop the main features of a linguistic model and an 
implementation that allow to automatically identify illocutionary 
connections anchored to transitions. In this first experiment, three main 
illocutionary connections are considered: Disagreeing, Agreeing and 
Arguing. The other connections such as reframing or conceding are not 
considered here: they are relatively infrequent. It is interesting to see in 
this corpus that the level of disagreement is relatively high, this means 
that dialogues are rather controversial. 
This first investigation is based on the linguistic cues found in the 
units at stake. It is clear that some cases need, in addition, context, 
knowledge and inference to be identified, however, linguistic analysis is 
favored because it is simpler, requires less resources and is relatively re-
usable, within similar dialogical contexts. Illocutionary connections 
anchored to transitions are identified on the basis of a pair, adjacent or 
not, of dialogue units, their contents and the illocutionary connection that 
is associated to each of them (see section above). It is clear also that in 
some cases, relatively limited, the taking into account of more than two 
units would introduce more contextual elements and would help to 
resolve ambiguities. 
For this preliminary mode, our development corpus is composed 
of 248 already tagged transitions between units. This is not very large, 
but seems to be sufficient for our current aim. Transitions without any 
illocutionary connections are not considered in this investigation, they 
correspond to about 15 to 20% of the situations, and will be investigated 
in a later stage of the project. 
Let us now develop the linguistic model elaborated for each of the 
illocutionary connections given above. Let us consider a pair of units (U1, 
U2) and the transition T that occur between them. U1 and U2 respectively 
have the illocutionary connections Uif1 and Uif2, while T is anchored the 
illocutionary connection Tif. The model that is developed below 
considers the linguistic contents of U1 and U2, Uif1 and Uif2 and the fact 
that these are uttered by the same speaker (S1) or by different speakers 
(S1 and S2). This analysis has obviously a relational character, between 
units and speakers.  
Since our corpus is quite small, we have first identified linguistic 
marks, explaining why they contribute to disagreeing, agreeing or 
arguing and then we have slightly generalized them via synonyms or 
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equivalent expressions. Finally, these marks have been grammaticalized, 
when relevant, in order to avoid long lists of terms and to favor a “local” 
grammar approach that characterizes illocutionary connections 
anchored to transitions. 
 
6.1 A model for Disagreeing 
 
A first parameter to consider are the illocutionary connections assigned 
to U1 and U2. Some typical cases have been identified such as: 
 
[U1: Assert] & [U2: Assertive Question] & [different speakers] 
à Disagreeing 
 
Where Disagreeing is the illocutionary connection anchored to 
the transition T. Some typical language expressions may also be involved 
as constraints in order to confirm disagreement, since there are 
situations which may be ambiguous with other illocutionary connections. 
A second situation is the case where U1 and U2 are uttered by two 
different speakers, or where there is a reported speech situation, usually 
in U1, and where forms of negation are observed in either U1 or U2. 
Roughly, these forms of negation indicate that the speakers do not share 
the same point of view. These forms of negation are quite numerous. Let 
us cite here the main categories: 
(1) Variants of negation: “I do not”, “I don’t”, “I cannot”, “can never”, 
etc. These forms are essentially observed contrastively in U2. 
(2) Negatively oriented propositional attitudes: “I disagree”, “I cannot 
accept”, etc. 
(3) Contrastive connectors between U1 and U2: however, but, etc. 
(4) Negatively oriented lexical terms: “sluggish”, “bad”, “wrong”, 
“aberration”, “harmful”, etc. associated with a judgement in U2 
about a fact reported in U1. 
(5) Contextually negative terms: “coercive”, “peculiar”, “warnings”, 
“dangerous” found in U2 as a response to U1 and negative 
judgement terms: “unwanted”, “undesired”, “hazardous” in U2 
when a fact or opinion is given in U1 
(6) Use of antonyms in U1 and U2, bipolar or continuous: “expensive 
/ cheap”, “moral / immoral”, or the negation, in any order, e.g.: 
“coercive / not coercive”. 
The last main situation to consider occurs when U1 and U2 are 
produced by the same speaker, with two situations: 
(a) the use of contrastive expression: P but Q or 
(b) a reported speech situation, citing someone else or an admitted 
opinion. 
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Our lexicon of negative terms contains about 100 terms, which is 
not very large. This indicates that speakers tend to use terms which can 
be understood by a large population of listeners. Each of the above 
situations is expressed by a “local” grammar and may be associated with 
constraints and restrictions. 
 
6.2 A model for Agreeing 
 
The linguistic model for Agreeing is based on the same philosophy, it may 
be slightly simpler. It is structured around two main situations: 
The Illocutionary connections assigned to U1 and U2 may 
precisely characterize forms of agreement, e.g.: 
 
[U1: Assert] & [U2: Assertive Question] & [same speaker for U1 
and U2] à Agreeing 
 
Typical forms of agreement in U2, with no negation in U1, often 
define forms of agreement. Among the most typical ones, let us cite: 
(1) Typical forms of approving: yes, OK, I’m happy, etc. 
(2) Forms expressing an opinion that approves U1 contents: I think, 
they are right, I agree, I like, etc. 
(3) Typical positive expressions, positive evaluative expressions: 
sympathetic, interesting, powerful point, etc. 
(4) Typical positive binders between U1 and U2: as you say, your own 
experience, well not followed by any negative expression, etc. 
These forms of agreement are more or less strong (e.g. I do not 
disagree is less strong than I agree). Measuring these connections is 
beyond the present investigation since these are relative to the speaker 
and to the situation. It is interesting to note that language seems to be 
richer in negative terms than in positive ones. Our lexicon of positively 
oriented terms contains at the moment about 60 terms. 
 
6.3 A model for Arguing 
 
Arguing is by large the main situation (70% of the cases in our 
development corpus, but this may vary from dialogue to dialogue). 
Arguing can occur between two speakers or a given speaker may be 
arguing for his/her own views. 
In our analysis, Arguing is considered as the by-default option: if 
no Disagreeing or Agreeing situation has been detected, then by default it 
is an Arguing illocutionary connection.  
However, to confirm our analysis, a few linguistic cues have been 
identified, which may be used when there are ambiguities with agreeing 
or disagreeing. These mainly are: 
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(1) Unit discourse connectors: but also, if you, indeed, so (with 
some constraints), etc. 
(2) Connectors such as but or however introducing U2, without 
any negative expression in U2. 
 
6.4 Implementation and performances 
 
This relatively simple linguistic model has been implemented on our 
TextCoop platform using discourse patterns and constraints. The results 
obtained are reported in table 4, expressed in terms of accuracy (we 
consider our evaluation as indicative, therefore tests involving precision 
and recall are not yet relevant): 
 
Illocutionary 
connection 
Correctly 
recognized 
Not correctly 
recognized 
Disagreeing 82% 18% 
Agreeing 85% 10% 
Arguing 95% 5% 
Table 4. Performance results of automated extraction of 
illocutionary connections. 
 
Results are good in spite of the relative simplicity of the analysis 
and the complexity of the task. One of the reasons is that speakers of the 
Moral Maze make their best to use a clear language, well-structured with 
explicit marks so that they position and argumentation is clear and 
unambiguous. Results could be different if one considers less controlled 
dialogues. 
An important remark concerns the errors: among the ‘not 
correctly recognized’ connections, only about 1/3 of them are due to an 
incomplete or incorrect linguistic analysis or to language ambiguities, 
while the other 2/3 would require knowledge and inference to identify 
the illocutionary connection anchored to the transition. This would be an 
interesting research direction: the pragmatic forms of disagreement or 
agreement. In a number of situations, domain knowledge can help 
identify the correct connection, but this is much more costly in terms of 
resources than just using linguistic knowledge. 
This section has presented a preliminary linguistic and language 
processing analysis of illocutionary connections anchored to transitions, 
in addition to the works done on unit delimitation and their illocutionary 
connection identification, presented above. This work remains largely 
exploratory and is still preliminary. Results show that linguistic analysis 
is worth pursuing but that a relatively large number of cases (about 15%) 
need pragmatic analysis which is not surprising, even in well-formed 
dialogues. This rate should be higher in less controlled ones. 
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7. CONCLUSION  
 
This paper has reported on the first few steps of a new methodology for 
understanding argument structure in dialogue that is predicated on the 
constraints imposed on interaction by tacit common understanding of the 
dialogue game that is being played. The work has demonstrated that even 
quite simple rules of these games – rules that describe some of the ways 
in which speakers can disagree, agree and argue – can constrain 
expressions sufficiently to be able to contribute significantly to the 
extremely demanding AI task of automatically recognising argument 
structure in free natural language. Though this paper reports early 
advances, it demonstrates that the approach represents a rich seam of 
academic investigation. 
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